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The love of all kinds of words that loftily start with the pre x “euro” has been evident in Ukraine for some time. 
Just drive down the streets of any major city in the country and you will see “Eurotires,” “Eurorenovations” next 
to “Eurowindows,” “Eurosalon” and “Eurostyle.” Take a stroll down the corridors of power and you will get an 
earful of “Eurointegration,” “Eurostandards” and “European-style education.” And if you have a chance to look 
at posters for an upcoming performance schedule, you are bound to see the phrase “European level” applied to 
the latest show or concert.
Europeanization 
and European integration
Everybody with a product to sell deliberately “pack-
ages” it in a box labeled “Euro,” thereby admitting 
automatically that European means better quality. 
At the same time, it is significant that this “Euroma-
nia” is most evident in shop windows and names. 
Symbolic because this kind of widespread “facade 
Europeanization” has been evident for some time 
in Ukraine. In short, on the surface, everyone seems 
keen to live according to European standards, but in 
fact, people have little or no idea what this actually 
means. And so, to paraphrase Javier Solana, they 
play not by the rules, but with the rules.
To be perfectly fair, we have to admit that even 
world-class European analysts have been unable to 
come up with a single definition for the term “Euro-
peanization.” Or in what way it differs from Europe-
an integration. Some prominent Old World analysts 
claim that this primarily means the carrying out of 
reforms that would allow a given country to freely 
join the European Union. Others suggest that Eu-
ropeanization is more like a process when everyone 
in the country, from politicians to waiters, upholds 
certain accepted standards. Yet others say that Euro-
peanization is the European answer to globalization.
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Some would narrow the concept to mean the devel-
opment of institutions that are analogous to those 
in the European Union. And yet others consider Eu-
ropeanization the reconstruction of an identity, that 
is, the accent is placed on cultural and historical as-
pects. Of course, all these notions of Europeaniza-
tion complement each other, rather than contradict-
ing. At the same time, they are all an indivisible part 
of European integration.
In short, what does it mean 
to meet the standards of the 
European Union? This es-
sentially means to meet the 
standards of Western Euro-
pean countries. What the 
US’s former Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
once rather disdainfully re-
ferred to as “Old Europe”—
a phrase that is now happily 
used. In the end, no matter 
how we approach Europe-
anization, we will reach one 
and the same goal: a certain 
set of standards, whether they refer to governance, 
education or food products, service, or even the 
pace of life and R&R. 
What does it 
mean to meet 
EU standards? 
This really means 
complying with 
Western European 
standards
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Thus, in the case of Ukraine, the two terms, Europe-
anization and Eurointegration, should be treated as 
synonyms. In both cases, it means nothing less than 
“transplanting” certain principles and norms that 
underpin how people live and work in Western Eu-
rope to our post-soviet soil. That is, what the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined the 
EU five years ago and Bulgaria and Romania, who 
joined in 2007, did.
But can Ukraine strive, as did her western neighbors 
when they stormed the gates of the EU in 2004, to 
match Western European countries or should the 
country first aim at a lower standard, that is, take new 
EU members like Poland or Slovakia as its model? 
Can Ukraine seriously undertake reforms without 
reconstructing its identity first? Finally, a question 
that is growing in urgency as the European Union 
suffers enlargement fatigue—how can Ukraine be-
come more European without the prospect of EU 
membership?
Identity crisis
Unless there is an understanding that Ukraine has 
the right to be not only in Europe, but also in the 
European Union, Europeanization will remain little 
more than a virtual topic, just as European integra-
tion has been, year after year. Four years ago, not 
long after the Orange Revolution, only a third of 
Ukrainians (33%) considered themselves Europeans 
according to a poll by the Razumkov Center, while 
60% firmly said they did not. In a more recent poll, 
taken by the State Institute for Family and Youth at 
the end of 2008, only 32.8% of students felt that they 
were Europeans—yet this generation is seen as key 
to the future promotion of European integration in 
Ukraine.
Meanwhile, feeling yourself European does not 
automatically mean a desire to join the European 
Union. This was more than clearly stated, if quite 
crudely, some six years ago by then-head of the Eu-
ropean Commission, Romano Prodi. At the time, he 
said, “The fact that Ukrainians believe themselves 
European is a matter of self-identity. New Zealand-
ers also consider themselves Europeans but that 
doesn’t constitute a reason for New Zealand to join 
the EU.”
Still, while no one looked cross-eyed at the desire 
of Ukrainians to feel themselves Europeans during 
Prodi’s term in the European Commission, in the 
last few years, the European Union, by denying the 
“Europeanness” of Ukraine as a state, has done lit-
tle to strengthen such feelings. Unfortunately, this 
trend is growing stronger all the time. For instance, 
prior to last year’s Ukraine–EU Summit in Paris, 
such member states as Germany and the Nether-
lands insisted on changing the closing communiqué 
to read “European country” (a geographical term) 
instead of “European state” (a political term). And 
at the inaugural Summit of the Eastern Partnership 
(EP), which took place last May in Prague, some of 
the EU’s older members did not even want to label 
Ukraine a “European country.” Originally, the plan 
was to treat Ukraine and five other states simply as 
eastern partners in the summary documents. True, 
they changed their mind in the end and agreed to 
the term “Eastern European Partners.”
In the case of CEE countries, says Slovak expert and 
president of the country’s Institute for Civil Affairs 
Grigorij Mesežnikov, the whole point was precisely 
political Europeanization, given that “at the level of 
culture and civilization, these countries were, are 
and will remain European countries, that is, societies 
with a European cultural code…For these countries, 
Eurointegration became a component of European-
ization. Moreover, accession to the EU was the final 
stage in the process of political Europeanization.”
It is probably not worth noting that these countries 
were very much wanted in Brussels, whereas “no 
one is expecting us there,” as certain of Ukraine’s 
politicians would like to have Ukrainians believe. At 
a recent session of the Diplomatic Club of the Open 
Ukraine Foundation in Kyiv, ex-Polish President 
Alexander Kwasniewski admitted that, after talk-
ing to then-French President Jacques Chirac about 
Poland’s joining the EU and listening to Chirac ex-
pound about what a terrible, difficult European in-
tegration faced the Poles, he completely lost his ap-
petite for accession.
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No stick, no reforms?
Still and all, there is one critical difference between 
Ukraine and its former colleagues in the socialist 
camp—they had a clear signal about their pros-
pects for membership. “Theoretically, European-
ization without the prospect of EU membership is 
possible—but it’s highly unlikely,” says Polish ana-
lyst Andrzej Szeptycki, summarizing the opinion of 
more than one specialist in Eurointegration. “We 
have European countries like Norway and Switz-
erland that are not members of the EU. We have 
extra-European countries that have independently 
adopted European standards and a European life-
style at one point, such as Japan in the 19th century. 
Yet, the EU’s policy towards neighboring countries, 
especially those in the Mediterranean basin, where 
there has been active cooperation for many years, 
shows that exporting European standards without 
membership is not easy.”
In Ukraine, an indirect confirmation of this difficul-
ty are political slogans along the lines of “Let’s build 
Europe inside our country,” which have failed to as-
sume any real meaning despite being bandied about 
for years. Every official who was involved in the Eu-
rointegration process 
in Poland or any other 
Central European 
country will tell you 
that they were assisted 
in joining the European 
Union not only by EU 
financial and techni-
cal assistance—the 
EU carrot—, but also 
by constant monitor-
ing and strict oversight 
from Brussels—the EU 
stick.
Of course, some might 
say that Ukraine is ac-
tually better off than its 
western neighbors: the 
country can always use 
its non-candidate 
status as an excuse 
to ignore one or 
another condition 
being demanded 
by the European 
Union if it feels that 
that condition is 
extremely incon-
venient, in terms of 
its own interests, or 
even absurd (who has not heard about the require-
ments regarding the size and form of “EU” cucum-
bers?). Nevertheless, looking at the difficulties with 
preparations for EURO 2012—which ought to be 
a truly significant Eurointegration milestone for 
Kyiv—, it becomes ever-more evident that, without 
constant oversight and relentless criticism on the 
part of Brussels, nothing’s going to move ahead in 
Ukraine.
At the same time, it is equally understood that, in 
the long run, membership cannot be the be-all and 
end-all of Eurointegration for Ukraine. Even more 
so, the absence of such a prospect should not be a 
form of blackmail that Ukraine uses in order to jus-
tify to Brussels why domestic reforms just aren’t 
happening. Yet, from the side it looks exactly like 
that.
“Why is it that, instead of changing your society, 
you are constantly looking for excuses not to do 
so?” This question was put to the author by the Pres-
ident of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, at the end of 
2008. “Estonia is a highly computerized country, not 
because it’s good for the EU but because it’s good 
for us. We have great roads, not because we want 
to please the European Union, but because we need 
them ourselves.” And he was justified in his conclu-
sions: “I have been involved with Ukraine for more 
than a decade—from the minute I became Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in 1996. And if you look at where 
Ukraine was in 1996 and where Estonia was, the dif-
ference was not that remarkable. But if you look at 
Ukraine and Estonia in 2008, we are in completely 
different positions.”
As the process  
of preparing for  
EURO 01 continues, 
it becomes obvious 
that, without constant 
oversight and 
relentless criticism 
from Brussels, 
nothing’s going to 
move ahead in Ukraine
Computer penetration  
is high in Estonia,  
not because it’s good  
for the EU, but because  
it’s good for Estonians
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The Real Europe
And when we talk about different positions, we are 
not just talking about matching the “Copenhagen 
criteria” that few ordinary Ukrainians know much 
about, which require that the country be demo-
cratic, respect the rule of law and human rights, and 
possess a proper market economy. Europeanization, 
in reality, involves very much down-to-earth condi-
tions that simply make life better for the ordinary 
person.
Living in a Europeanized country means knowing 
that an official who took off to hunt one weekend 
in a government car will step down from his office 
(similar to what happened to the Lithuanian head 
of the State Property Fund), while his colleague, a 
presidential advisor, will write a letter of resigna-
tion the following day after voters see a photo in the 
papers of a fancy house that he built just outside of 
Vilnius for lord-knows-what money.
Living in a European country means being certain 
that the bus for which you are waiting at a stop will 
come according to schedule and will “kneel” so 
that the granny next to you will be able to enter it 
without looking for someone to help her, while the 
young man in the wheelchair will be able to get from 
Point A to Point B like any other passenger.
It means being able to defend your rights in a court 
of law, and not by camping out in tents on the coun-
try’s squares—which is possibly (the thought is 
scary) the only way to affect those in power in this 
country.
It means not being likely to run into waiters and oth-
er individuals in the service industry who are rude or 
completely indifferent to their job. And the extreme 
unlikeliness that you will ever be accosted in any 
airport or downtown area by pesky taxi drivers who 
leap on foreign visitors with an irritating “Wanna 
cab” and launch into negotiations over a price!
And if Europeanization is crowned with accession to 
the European Union, then the list of benefits grows 
geometrically.
It means, for instance, being able to choose whether 
you want to work in Sweden or Ireland, then retir-
ing, if you so wish, to sunny Spain or Portugal, but 
getting the pension you earned where you used to 
live.
It means studying in a prestigious university at the 
EU tuition rate, which is much lower than the rate 
paid by students from non-EU countries (right now, 
only the children of the nouveaux riches from former 
soviet countries can even begin to think of study-
ing in London or 
Oxford). For Ukrai-
nians, of course, 
this may not have 
much appeal, given 
that the current EU 
student exchange 
program, Erasmus 
Mundus, only in-
volved 24 students 
in the 2005–2006 
academic year (Po-
land sent some-
thing like 10,000!). 
For 2009-2010, this 
number increased 
by a whopping 4, 
to 28 students from 
Ukraine.
It means the option of working not only in the capi-
tal of Ukraine but also in any European capital. For 
Ukrainian politicians, specifically, it also means the 
opportunity to compete for seats in the European 
Parliament or the European Commission, where 
they will be able to improve their political culture 
and understand, finally, that what makes politics 
worthwhile is not diamond cuff links and cars that 
cost as much as an apartment in Berlin.
It means the opportunity for ordinary farmers in dis-
tant villages to deposit tens of thousands of Euros on 
their accounts, an award from the EU just because 
they have ensured the necessary environment for 
their animals and produce high-quality food. To-
day, this is standard stuff for Polish and Lithuanian 
Ukrainian politicians  
will have an opportunity 
to improve their political 
culture and to understand 
that what makes politics 
worthwhile is not 
diamond clips and cars 
that cost as much as  
an apartment in Berlin
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farmers. Of course, it’s also interesting that, at the 
beginning, EU veterinary legislation to which new 
member states had to adapt themselves looked pret-
ty silly to our neighbors. They could not understand 
at all why the EU demanded that their legislation 
establish a minimal quantity of grain to feed cattle. 
But the Polish lawyers who worked on harmonizing 
this legislation in the Sejm took it in all in stride, re-
sponding: “We have to do this if we want to get into 
the European Union.”
It means not seeing cars on your streets whose ex-
haust contains far more CO2 than the norm, let alone 
beat-up trucks like the ones that drive Ukrainian 
streets, leaving a trail of stinky black smoke. And to 
be convinced that the selection of cars on the road 
should be a hundredfold less shiny than the state of 
the actual roads, the way it is in Warsaw today; in 
Kyiv, by contrast, road surfaces are in pitiful condi-
tion, while the cars driving on them are the height 
of luxury.
It means that even in the most backwoods Polish 
town, such as Dembica in the south or Olesznica 
in the west, you can visit a modern and (take note) 
affordable aqua park built on European Union 
money, something that even the capital of Ukraine 
cannot claim right now. (The entry price is around 
UAH 40.)
It means the opportunity for mayors to pay atten-
tion, again with the financial assistance of the EU, 
to cultural heritage and to rebuild historical sites 
that were ruined under the communist regime. En-
tire boards announcing “Built with European Union 
funding” are a common feature on buildings and 
streets in most population centers across Central 
and Eastern Europe.
It’s not just a way to travel to the next country for 
coffee without a visa or borders, a pleasure the resi-
dents of Bratislava, who frequently drop into Vienna 
for this purpose, have been able to allow themselves 
for the last five years. It’s also a way for those who 
live in border areas to visit the nearest supermarket 
in the country next door and to buy all their neces-
sities for a better price. For instance, Slovaks have 
been able to do this in Hungary and Poland ever 
since they joined the Euro zone.
Team play
These were only individual examples of European-
ization and Eurointegration in action. At the same 
time, what results from the enormous task taken on 
by the relevant political leaders who understood in 
time that, under the new EU rules, they would not be 
able to take bribes and live off kickbacks, but they 
would be certain of a worthy and, more important, 
legitimate salary and the kind of working conditions 
about which they could only dream earlier! Most 
of all, their children will live in a country where all 
the pluses mentioned earlier will be part of normal, 
 everyday life.
In various EU coun-
tries, different peo-
ple led this process. 
For instance, dur-
ing negotiations 
between Slovakia 
and the European 
Union, which took 
place over 1999–
2002, special de-
partments were set 
up in all central 
executive bodies in 
charge of “Europe-
anization” in spe-
cific areas. In Poland, there was a special Committee 
for European Integration.
As Grigorij Mesežnikov recalls, starting in 1998, 
the Slovak Government and political parties who 
supported it, as well as the majority of community 
organizations, the press and most of the country’s 
creative and intellectual elite, effectively spoke 
with one voice on matters related to Eurointegra-
tion. But what was important in this process was that 
roles were clearly designated: the Government was 
responsible for the negotiation process and for in-
stituting European standards, NGOs monitored this 
process and analyzed it, the press worked on increas-
The process of 
Eurointegration requires 
that there be a clearly 
designated role for the 
government, NGOs, the 
press, the private sector, 
and the intellectual class
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ing public awareness regarding EU membership, 
business worked on strengthening economic ties to 
Western Europe, while the intellectuals determined 
the main areas of European discourse, connecting 
membership in the European Union with the cul-
tural and civilization foundations of Slovak society. 
The situation in Poland was very similar.
Of course, in one country the government and NGOs 
might have taken more on itself, in another business 
may have been or continues to be the key promoter of 
a bright Eurointegrated future. In the case of Turkey, 
the private sector is a powerful driver for EU integra-
tion in this “eternal candidate.” It is Turkish business 
that pushed the government to establish a Customs 
Union between the EU and Turkey, something that 
a significant portion of Turkish society was, unsur-
prisingly, hardly enthused about. It’s understand-
able why they were not: Europe’s more competitive 
goods represented a major challenge for domesti-
cally-produced goods. In addition, having given the 
green light to goods made by their European Union 
business colleagues, Turkey found itself completely 
unassisted when it came to participating in the adop-
tion of any trade policies within the EU.
Needless to say, a broad pro-European alliance 
among those political forces oriented on EU mem-
bership, who all have support among voters, and 
a similar division of roles could become the main 
driver of European integration in Ukraine. Of 
course, this requires that the political leadership 
understand that the prospect of membership cannot 
be the starting gun for adapting legislation, bring-
ing order to the judiciary or prosecuting graft and 
bribery. That business begin to feel that Russia is not 
the only place for making money and the EU only a 
place for depositing it. That the press start to write 
about life in the European Union on a regular basis 
and not just after the latest press tour organized by 
the Government of Poland or Lithuania. That NGOs 
begin to point out contradictions between politi-
cians’ talk on European integration and their walk. 
Really, none of this is especially hard.
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